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I.  Cast of Characters 
 
A. Niklas Zennstrom - Rdio Founder 
Niklas Zennstrom is something of an icon in the tech startup space. He, along 
with Janus Friis, founded some of the largest software platforms of the new 
millennium, including the widely-used internet calling program Skype and the 
now somewhat obscure file sharing platform Kazaa.1 Zennstrom was no stranger 
to the boom and bust cycle of creating tech startups and selling them off to the 
highest bidder. Zennstrom lead Skype to a successful acquisition in 2005 when it 
was sold to eBay to the tune of $3.1 billion.2 Skype was later re-acquired by an 
investment group of which Zennstrom was a part, and then sold yet again to 
Microsoft for $8.5 billion.3 Prior to Rdio, it looked like Zennstrom had the Silicon 
Valley equivalent of the Midas touch. In 2006 he was named one of Time 
Magazine’s 100 most influential people, and has received several other 
professional and entrepreneurial accolades and acknowledgements.4 He attended 
Uppsala University in Sweden and the University of Michigan, where he obtained 
degrees in Business and Computer Science.5 He is currently the President of the 
European Tech Alliance, which is a collaborative tech business association, and 
CEO of the venture capital firm Atomico.6 
 
B. Janus Friis - Rdio Founder 
Janus Friis was a co-founder, alongside Niklas Zennstrom, of Skype and Kazaa. 
Friis was also instrumental in the founding of several other tech startups.7  Like 
his counterpart Zennstrom, Friis was also listed in the list of Time Magazine’s top 
100 most influential people.8  He also received an award in his home country of 
                                                          
1 Atomico, https://perma.cc/P4GT-92ZH (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 Britannica, https://perma.cc/Y495-G87K, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
8 Id. 
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Denmark called the “IT prize” awarded by the Danish tech industry.9  Friis 
dropped out of high school and holds no degrees.10  Zennstrom and Friis began 
working their first project, Kazaa, together shortly after the two met in the early 
2000s.11 
 
C. Anthony Bay - Rdio CEO 
Before coming on as the CEO of Rdio, Bay was an executive at Amazon in their 
digital video sector.12 Bay had also previously worked for Apple and Microsoft. 
Bay holds a B.A. from UCLA and an M.B.A. from San Jose State University. 
Rdio had other CEOs prior to Bay, but it was Bay who was at the helm when the 
ship ultimately sank into Chapter 11.  
 
D. Elliott Peters - Rdio General Counsel 
Elliot Peters began his career as an associate with a firm called Shearman & 
Sterling LLP.13 He then worked as the head of digital legal affairs at Warner 
Music Group for ten years, did a two year stint with Apple, then came on with 
Rdio in August of 2013.14 After Rdio, Peters became the CEO of EDIH Group 
LLC, which appears to be a small or solo consulting firm.15 There is little 
information about this company online other than it has been an active business 
entity for the last five months as of this writing.16 
 
E. Judge Dennis Montali - Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court of Northern California 
Judge Dennis Montali presided over Rdio’s Chapter 11 case. He is a member of a 
number of professional organizations, and was first appointed as the Bankruptcy 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Techcrunch.com, Catherine Shu, https://perma.cc/D9X8-AXPL, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
13 LinkedIn, https://www.linkedin.com/in/elliottpeters/, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Bizapedia, https://perma.cc/YCE7-KUX5, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
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Judge of the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division, in 1993.17 
He holds a B.A. from Notre Dame and a J.D. from UC Berkley.18 
 
F. Tracy Hope Davis - U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee 
Tracy Hope Davis was appointed as U.S. Trustee for Northern and Eastern 
California in November of 2013.19 
 
G. Universal Media Group 
The relevant portion of Universal in this proceeding is Universal Music Group, or 
UMG Recordings, Inc.20  It was founded in 1934 and is headquartered in Santa 
Monica, CA.  It is a subsidiary of Vivendi, a massive multination media 
conglomerate based in Paris, France.21  Its CEO is Lucian Grainge.  Universal, 
along with Warner and Sony, are considered to be the mainstays of the global 
music industry.  It reported revenue of approximately $5.6 billion in 2016.22  
Universal would become one of Rdio’s largest unsecured creditors and would 
ultimately receive a negotiated settlement rather than a pro rata distribution from 
the unsecured creditors fund.23 
 
H. Warner Music Group 
Warner Music Group is the relevant portion of Warner in this case.  Warner is 
another of the “big three” record labels, consisting of Universal, Warner, and 
Sony.24  Warner was founded in 1958 as Warner Bros. Records and had annual 
                                                          
17 U.S. Courts, https://perma.cc/T3DK-HX3Z, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
18 Id. 
19 U.S. Dept. of Justice, https://perma.cc/7JH3-YY9J, (Last visited April 12, 2017). 
20 Billboard.com, https://perma.cc/RJL3-EQ6R, (Last visited April 15, 2017). 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Order Approving Universal Settlement Agreement, Doc. No. 419, at 2-3. 
24 TheBalance.com, Heather McDonald, https://perma.cc/G4QS-QP9R, (Last visited April 15, 
2017) 
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revenue of $2.97 billion in 2015.25  Their CEO is Stephen Cooper.26  Warner 
Music Group is a subsidiary of Time Warner.27   Warner was also one of Rdio’s 
largest unsecured creditors and would, like Universal, ultimately receive a 
negotiated settlement outside of the pro rata distributions that other unsecured 
creditors received.28 
 
I. Sony 
The relevant subsidiary of the Sony family of companies in this case is Sony 
Music Entertainment.29  It was founded under the Sony name in 1991.  Its CEO is 
Robert Stringer, and it reported annual revenue of $4.89 billion in 2014.30  Sony 
came to the table ready to fight.  It was, by all party’s appraisals, the largest of 
Rdio’s unsecured creditors and extremely unhappy with Pulser and how it had 
structured its secured debt.31  It looked for a moment as though Sony, Rdio, and 
Pulser were going to litigate an entirely separate proceeding in New York over a 
series of claims.32  Sony, before it ultimately settled, claimed fraud against Pulser 
and Rdio. Likewise, Pulser and Rdio claimed anti-trust violations by Sony.33  
Luckily for all parties involved, a plan would ultimately be approved without 
resort to outside litigation, but only after serious posturing by Sony that could 
have potentially, if successfully executed, left Pulser with nothing.34 
 
 
                                                          
25 Billboard.com, https://perma.cc/4PQ2-PWYR, (Last visited April 15, 2017). 
26 Id. 
27 TheBalance.com, Heather Mcdonald, https://perma.cc/L69U-WK8F, (Last visited April 15, 
2017). 
28 Order Approving Warner Settlement Agreement, Doc. No. 418, at 2-3. 
29 Appointment of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, Doc. No. 33. 
30 Sony.net, https://www.sony.net/SonyInfo/IR/library/fr/13q4_sony.pdf, (Last visited April 24, 
2017). 
31 Variety.com, Janko Roettgers, https://perma.cc/N3CX-M77B, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
32 Id. 
33 Factmag.com, Scott Wilson, https://perma.cc/T4NY-JPFR, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
34 Compl., Sony Music Entertainment, v. Anthony Bay, Elliott Peters, and Jim Rondinelli, 
No1:16-cv-02505-RJS, (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2016), Doc. No. 1. 
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J. Pulser Media 
Pulser Media (“Pulser”) was the primary equity holder of Rdio. Cumulus Media, 
Inc., a traditional radio company, eventually bought a sizable portion of equity in 
Rdio, but Pulser maintained majority control of all outstanding shares and 
maintained its directors on the board of Rdio throughout the life of the company.35  
Pulser was also by far the largest secured creditor of Rdio, although the nature of 
this secured debt would ultimately come under fire from the unsecured creditors 
committee.36 Rather than going to total war with the secured creditors and risking 
it all, Pulser ultimately agreed to accept pennies on the dollar for its secured 
claims, with the remainder becoming last priority unsecured debt, and collecting 
nothing on the latter.37 
 
K. Pandora Media 
Pandora was formed in 2000 and continues to be a major player in the streaming music 
business.38 It was the only interested buyer for Rdio, and made an offer of $75 million 
for the key assets, but conditioned the offer on Rdio going through bankruptcy 
proceedings.39 
 
L. Iconical II 
Iconical Investments II, Inc. (“Iconical”) is a venture capital firm and was the 
second of only two secured creditors of Rdio.40 Unlike Pulser, Iconical collected 
substantially on its secured claim41, and did not suffer the same accusations of 
                                                          
35 BizJournal, https://perma.cc/K2XM-UA6S, (Last Visited April 14, 2017) 
36 Committee of Unsecured Creditors for Order Approving Employment of FTI Consulting, Inc. 
as its Financial Advisor Effective November 20, 2015, Doc. No. 162 at 3-5.  
37 Order Confirming Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization dated August 18, 2016 and Establishing 
Administrative Claims Bar Date, Doc. No. 432. 
38 Vator.tv, Steven Loeb, https://perma.cc/8PY4-CSC6, (Last visited April 26, 2017).  
39  Debtor's Emergency Motion for an Order: (1) Approving Bidding Procedures; (2) Approving 
Stalking Horse Bid Protections Including Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement. . . ; Doc. 
No. 13 at 9:3-9 
 
40 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim 
and Final Orders:(I) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Obtain Post-Petition Financing . . ., Doc. No. 3. 
41 Order Confirming Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization dated August 18, 2016 and Establishing 
Administrative Claims Bar Date, Doc. No. 432. 
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sham equity that ultimately caused Pulser to negotiate a settlement on its secured 
claims. 
 
II. Background: The Origins and Pre-Petition History of Rdio 
 
 Rdio, Inc. (interchangeably “Rdio” and the “Debtor”) was a music streaming service 
much in the vein of current industry titans such as Pandora, Spotify, and Apple Music.  The 
company was co-founded by Skype creators Niklas Zennstrom and Janus Friis in 2008, and 
began operations on August 3, 2010.42  The company hoped to set itself apart from other 
contemporary competitors in the music streaming industry by creating new, far more 
customizable listening options than those offered by its competitors.  The concept was very 
ambitious (indeed, ultimately too ambitious), Rdio hoped to create a large online music library 
that would allow its listeners to specifically select a specific song they wished to hear at any 
given moment, utilizing a simple music library interface not wholly unlike the iTunes interface, 
though completely online.  Some will note that is precisely what competitor Spotify created and 
launched shortly after Rdio came onto the scene.  The two services shared very similar features, 
with the key distinction being that Rdio launched first while Spotify launched shortly after.43 44  
This is in juxtaposition to competitors such as Pandora that allowed only radio type services, not 
allowing the listener to select individual songs or albums, but instead only allowing the listener 
to choose genres or radio stations.45 
 
This leap to allowing listeners the freedom to choose their own songs, albums, and even 
playlists was the obvious next step in the music streaming industry, but it would be Rdio who 
largely pioneered the process from concept to reality, even before Spotify.46  Ultimately, 
however, this model would prove to be too costly, with the lion’s share of revenue going to large 
studios who maintained licensing agreements with Rdio.47  The hope was that Rdio would 
eventually develop a large enough subscriber base that they could sustain themselves on volume, 
                                                          
42 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim 
and Final Orders:(I) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Obtain Post-Petition Financing . . ., Doc. No. 3 at 
4: 1-5. 
43 News.spotify.com, https://perma.cc/8JAM-3JGY, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
44 Engadget.com, Nathan Ingraham, https://perma.cc/68MQ-Y9LE, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
 
45 Diffen.com, https://perma.cc/2RXF-46FZ, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
46 Engadget.com, Nathan Ingraham, https://perma.cc/68MQ-Y9LE, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
47 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim 
and Final Orders: et al, Doc. No. 3 at 3: 17-29. 
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even with the extremely slim profit margins of the streaming industry.48  Critics of Rdio, from 
inside and outside of the company, noted the distinct lack of a well-directed, dedicated marketing 
effort and blamed this largely for the stagnant growth of the platform’s user base -- contrasting 
competitor Spotify’s successful marketing blitz to publicize itself as essentially a free online 
version of iTunes immediately from its launch.49   
 
By the time of its petition for Chapter 11, Rdio was estimated to have monthly revenue of 
around $1.6 million per month, derived chiefly from its subscribers, with a substantially smaller 
portion derived from ads.50  This was simply not enough cashflow to sustain the business, as 
around the same time Rdio was estimated to be spending roughly $4 million per month in 
expenses, maintaining expensive licensing agreements with major media studios and floating a 
somewhat extravagant payroll of silicon valley engineers and executives.51  Further, Rdio had 
approximately $30 million in unsecured debt at the time it went under, and approximately $190 
million in secured debt.52  The majority of the secured debt was held by Rdio’s largest 
shareholder, Pulser Media Inc. (hereinafter “Pulser”).53  “Equitable subordination” is not a 
catchy lyric in bankruptcy practice, but with the way Rdio had structured its debts with its parent 
company Pulser, it looked, at least to Rdio’s unsecured creditors, like that might be the hit single 
of this album.   
 
III. Events Preceding Rdio’s Bankruptcy. 
 
By late 2015, Rdio was running out of time.  It had likely always planned on the 
possibility being acquired, but they missed a note when calculating their burn rate.  
Hemorrhaging capital, Rdio executives began seeking a buyer for their distressed company.54  
Unprofitability is not unusual in tech startups like Rdio.  Oftentimes reckless companies 
following the Silicon Valley model seek to generate as much revenue as possible, regardless of 
                                                          
48 Id. 
49 Engadget.com, Nathan Ingraham, https://perma.cc/68MQ-Y9LE, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
50 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim 
and Final Orders:. . ., Doc. No. 3 at 3: 13-16. 
51 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Order: (1) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Pay and Honor Pre-
Petition Employee Wages, et al. Doc. No. 6 at 4: 1-12. 
52 Id. at 3:8-12. 
53 Id. at 3:8-12. 
54 Id. at 3:19-25. 
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what their actual profit is, with the hopes that their business will be highly valued, keeping in 
mind that overhead costs will shrink as the technology continues to develop.55  With little doubt, 
Rdio had likely initially hoped to follow this model, but even by the low-to-no profit model of 
Silicon Valley startups, Rdio was failing.  Despite all of this, Rdio did have some valuable assets 
and key personnel with intimate knowledge of those assets, comprised mostly of proprietary 
software and the engineers who created and maintained it.56  Their main hope was to find 
someone who valued its key assets, and to give the main players in Rdio a chance retain the best 
value. Rdio hired a financial services company called Moelis to solicit offers, then along came 
Pandora (hereinafter interchangeably “Pandora” and the “Stalking Horse”).57  
 
In their distressed state, Rdio was approached by Pandora with an offer, according to 
some sources, of approximately $100 million for Rdio’s “key assets.” These consisted of its most 
lucrative proprietary software and the personnel responsible for it.58  By the time everything was 
finished, however, the purchase price would be lowered by some $25 million down to $75 
million, which would be much to the disdain of the Unsecured Creditor’s Committee (hereinafter 
interchangeably the “Committee” or the “Unsecured Creditors Committee”).59  Initially, Rdio 
hoped to be acquired outright by competitor Pandora, but Pandora wasn’t hearing it.  They 
conditioned the purchase upon Rdio going through Chapter 11, and a stalking horse was born.60  
 
  
                                                          
55 Entrepreneur.com, https://perma.cc/9WBF-PW7W, (Last visited April 24, 2017). 
56 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Order: (1) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Pay and Honor Pre-
Petition Employee Wages . . ., Doc. No. 6 at 14: 1-12. 
57 Debtor's Emergency Motion for an Order: (1) Approving Bidding Procedures; (2) Approving 
Stalking Horse Bid Protections Including Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement. . . ; Doc. 
No. 13 at 9:3-9 
 
58 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Order: (1) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Pay and Honor Pre-
Petition Employee Wages. . ., Doc. No. 6 at 14: 1-12. 
59 Debtor's Emergency Motion for an Order: (1) Approving Bidding Procedures; (2) Approving 
Stalking Horse Bid Protections Including Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement. . .;, Doc. 
No. 13 at 16: 16-22. 
60 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Entry of Interim 
and Final Orders: . . , Doc. No. 3 at 5: 3-10. 
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IV. After the Petition is Filed, the Fights Begin. 
 
A. The Petition 
 
 Rdio filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court of the Northern District of California on November 16, 2015.  On the petition, Rdio 
estimated that there would be funds available for distribution to unsecured creditors.  It listed its 
creditors as more than 200, and fewer than 1,000.  The petition listed Rdio’s estimated assets at 
the time of filing as ranging between $50 and $100 million.61  The petition also listed Rdio’s 
estimated liabilities, which were, according the petition, between $100 and $500 million.62  Ron 
Bender, of Rdio’s bankruptcy counsel Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill LLP prepared and 
filed the petition, with Rdio General Counsel Elliot Peters providing the signature for the debtor, 
Rdio.63 
 
 Attached as Exhibit A64 to the petition were certain resolutions of Rdio’s Board of 
Directors.  These resolutions designate CEO Anthony Bay and General Counsel Elliot Peters as 
the parties responsible for handing the administration of the bankruptcy and authorize them to 
employ the bankruptcy counsel noted above (Levene, Neale, Bender, Yoo & Brill).65  Further, 
blanket authority is given to Bay and Peters to employ additional professionals as needed to 
administer the bankruptcy.  The directors’ resolution expressly lays out objectives for Bay and 
Peters in the short term, while also noting that their authority is not limited exclusively to those 
objectives.66  The key points of concern seem to be use of cash collateral, obtaining post-
bankruptcy financing, resolving outstanding employee matters including compensation, hiring, 
and termination matters, collections of accounts receivable, negotiating with parties currently in 
contract with Rdio, soliciting offers for the liquidation of assets, and overseeing the creation and 
implementation of a plan.  Bay and Peters’ authority, however, was more expansive.67  The 
resolutions contained several pages of boilerplate ensuring that Bay and Peters had the broadest 
                                                          
61 Voluntary Petition, Rdio Inc., Doc. No. 1. 
62 Id. at 1. 
63 Id. at 4. 
64 Id. at 5-7. 
65 Id. at 5. 
66 Id. at 5-7. 
67 Id. 
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actual authority possible to execute the bankruptcy successfully, or alternatively, to remove the 
directors as culpable parties in the event of something going wrong.   
 
 Next, the petition lists the 20 largest unsecured creditors of Rdio and how much debt each 
one held. They are as follows: 
 
1. Roku, Inc. (“Roku”) holding $2,759,423.00 
2. Sony Music Entertainment (“Sony”) holding $2,399,906.05 
3. AXS Digital, LLC (“AXS”) holding $1,250,410.00 
4. Shazam Media Services (“Shazam”) holding $1,171,118.76 
5. Warner Music Group (“Warner”) holding $613,374.05 
6. Dell Financial Servces (“Dell”) holding $554,305.44 
7. Facebook Inc. (“Facebook”) holding $495,548.90 
8. Orchard Enterprises, Inc. (“Orchard”) holding $383,959.52 
9. Music Reports, Inc. (“Music Reports”) holding $335,670.87 
10. Tseries (“Tseries”) holding $311,000.00 
11. Universal Music Group Distribution (“Universal”) holding $294,219.33 
12. Nventive, Inc. (“Nventive”) holding $272,230.00 
13. Kahuna, Inc. (“Kahuna”) holding $240,000.00 
14. Tunecore (“Tunecore”) holding $236,028.67 
15. Mosaic NerworX, LLC (“Mosaic”) holding $219,890.40 
16. Digital Realty Trust, LP (“Digital Realty”) holding $190,889.63 
17. Merlin BV Music and Entertainment Rights Licensing Ind Ne (“Merlin”) holding 
$134,960.04 
18. Intervision Systems Technologies, Inc. (“Intervision”) holding $130,908.27 
19. China Basin Ballpark Company, LLC (“China Basin”) holding $125,000.00 
20. Ando Media, LLC (“Ando”) holding $124,433.7468 
 
 The petition also includes a creditor matrix that lists the names and addresses of every 
creditor of Rdio, secured and unsecured.69  This goes on for more than 30 pages, listing all the 
major and minor players, and even including the popular indie rock band “Arcade Fire.”70 
 
  
                                                          
68 Id. at 8-10. 
69 List of all Creditors.  (no docket number listed). 
70 Id. at 2. 
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B. Significant First Day Motions 
 
The Debtor filed a standard motion to pay selected post-petition creditors on November 18, 
2015, this motion prayed that the court would allow Rdio to pay pre-petition employee wages 
and related payroll taxes, reimbursable and other employee expenses, and various employee 
benefits.71  It noted that no employee would receive more than $12,475 if the motion were 
approved.72 It also detailed Rdio’s company history as a music subscription service, and the 
woefully inadequate amount of monthly income Rdio produced, which was listed as 
approximately $1.6 million per month.  Rdio listed its assets which produced this income as 
“owned technology” (basically software and other propriety intellectual property), licensing 
agreements, subscribers, “employee talent pool”, and goodwill.73  It noted that these assets fail to 
produce sufficient revenue to cover the company’s relative enormous operating expenses of 
approximately $4 million per month.74  Seeing as how the content licensing agreements and the 
“employee talent pool” were a sizeable portion of the operating expenses, there is naturally room 
for speculation as to whether or not these two “assets” were in fact liabilities, but regardless, the 
books as a whole looked particularly grim for Rdio.  The motion made a point to state that Rdio 
at the time was employing no fewer than 140 American employees.75 
 
 The motion also outlined the classes that would eventually need to combat one another: 
the $190 million secured lenders, and the $30 million unsecured. It then referred the Court to the 
Motion for Cash Collateral for a more expansive rendering of the creditors before beginning to 
detail another key player: Moelis & Company (“Moelis”).76  Moelis was hired by Rdio in the fall 
of 2014 to try to get new equity invested in the business.  This failed. Moelis was then directed to 
find alternative forms of investment, a buyer, or possible merger partner.77  All the while Rdio 
was burning to the ground.  Then, “after conducting an extremely broad marking process, the 
                                                          
71 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Order: (1) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Pay and Honor Pre-
Petition Employee Wages. . ., Doc. No. 6. 
72 Id. at 4: 17-23. 
73 Id. at 9: 25-28. 
74 Id at 9-11. 
75 Id at 2: 26-28. 
76 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for, and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of, 
Entry of Interim and Final Orders: (I) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Obtain Post-Petition Financing 
.. . . , Doc. No. 2. 
77 Omnibus Declaration of Maikao Grare. . , Doc. No. 9 at 5: 1-19. 
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highest and best offer” appeared.  This offer was from Pandora in form of $75 million cash for 
Rdio’s aforementioned technological assets.78  
 
 Pandora had some interest in Rdio’s licensing agreements and IP related goodwill.79  It 
did, however, have a great interest in muscling Rdio through Chapter 11, so much so that it 
conditioned the sale and purchase on Rdio filing a petition for bankruptcy the same day after the 
effective date listed in the Asset Purchase Agreement (the “APA”) between Rdio and Pandora.80  
This express framing of the agreement was listed as the first recital in the APA and was outlined 
in detail in the first day motions. Rdio’s motions were quick to note, however, that Pandora 
encouraged Rdio to seek overbids for these assets “to ensure the highest and best price [was] 
paid.”81  In other words, Pandora was very confident in its evaluation of $75 million.   
 
 Rdio’s motions conveyed how competitive the market was in the music streaming field 
and the possibility of attrition by key employees that would be needed to navigate and close the 
sale to Pandora, noting that even those employees who would be offered jobs at Pandora could 
look elsewhere if they would need to wait until after the asset sale to be paid.82  Rdio implored 
the Court to move swiftly and favorably, citing provisions in the APA that allowed Pandora to 
back out if certain quotas of current Rdio employees did not transition to Pandora.83  Essentially, 
Rdio, when speaking to the Court, categorizes the motion seeking approval of the APA as the 
domino that could bring down the entire contemplated transaction if not approved.  Given the 
urgency presented, it should be observed that Rdio’s employees were up to date on their 
paychecks on the day before filing.  Regardless, Rdio requested that the court approve their 
ability to continue paying employees.84  Rdio also asked to allow its estate to honor any pre-
petition checks or wire transfers sent to employees that had yet to clear as of the date of the first 
day motions, and further, it also wanted to be allowed to honor certain sick leave and vacation 
                                                          
78 Id. 
79 Declaration of Elliott Peters in Support of Debtor’s Motion for Authority to File Portions of a 
Document Under Seal, and to File Redacted Document, Doc. No. 48 at 25. 
80 Id at 7. 
81 Id at 11. 
82 Debtor’s Emergency Motion for Order: (1) Authorizing Debtor to (A) Pay and Honor Pre-
Petition Employee Wages . . , Doc. No. 6. 
83 Omnibus Declaration of Maikao Grare. . , Doc. No. 9 at 5-6. 
84 Id. 
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time, as well as other employment benefits.85  Rdio showed the Court that Pandora had taken it 
hostage in its first day motions, but it made some convincing arguments that its estate should be 
allowed to pay the ransom. 
 
 The Debtor also filed its first truly contentious motion, which was to allow it to employ a 
financial advisor.86  It began its request by outlining many of the facts that will seem familiar at 
this point, the amount of money Rdio was taking in pre-petition, the amount of money Rdio was 
losing pre-petition, and the like.  What is unique, however, is the level of detail in which 
Moelis’s central role was described.87  Moelis was employed by Pulser to find a solution to their 
Rdio problem, in the form of a buyer, merger, or otherwise.88  The first day motions detailed 
those efforts to the Court, the intimate relationship Rdio had with Moelis at the time, and how 
Moelis was uniquely equipped to aid Rdio through the sale process due in large part to its 
existing familiarity with Rdio’s finances.89   
 
 
C. Role of Moelis and Related Disputes 
 
 In its request for appointment of a financial advisor, Rdio laid out a rather expansive 
resume detailing Moelis’s success and versatility as a financial advising firm. It then detailed a 
very long list of cases with which Moelis had been involved.  Moelis’s proposed role in going 
forward with the Chapter 11 would include business and financial analysis, solicitation of 
overbidders, due diligence in evaluating overbidders, serve as an intermediary between Rdio and 
overbidders, and assist in conducting the auction of Rdio assets.90  Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
Pandora was set to stand as the highest, and only, bid to acquire Rdio’s assets.  This motion 
succeeded over an objection from the U.S. Trustee, and Moelis was brought on as post-petition 
financial advisor to the Debtor, racking up fees in the amount of: 
 
1) $100,000 per month,  
2) $2,250,000 +1% of sale proceeds above $75 million up to $100 million, and  
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3) +2.5% of sales proceeds that exceed $100 million.91  
 
 However, the amount brought in by the sales fees would be reduced by the amount of 
monthly fees previously paid to Moelis.92  This structure, on the one hand, lent credit to the idea 
that Rdio and Moelis diligently sought a potential overbidder;  on the other hand, the monthly 
fees were sizable enough that Moelis would have had no injury to itself by taking several 
additional months to solicit overbidders.93  Lastly, Moelis would also be reimbursed for any 
expenses incurred in the sale process, including legal fees for their outside counsel.94  Rdio also 
requested that Moelis not be required to maintain hourly records related to its billing of Rdio, as 
that was not their normal practice, and because “The Debtor believ[ed] that the ultimate benefits 
of Moelis’ services hereunder [could not] be measured by reference to the number of hours 
…expended by Moelis’ professionals in the performance of such services.”95  Rdio paid Moelis 
approximately $35K for pre-petition services, and, when the motion to approve Moelis was filed, 
had already paid an initial $100K advance payment in contemplation of the court approving 
Moelis as a financial advisor.96   
 
 This motion was approved, but not before stirring a minor controversy in the case.  Rdio 
had first retained Moelis & Company, LLC as a financial advisor in September 2014.97  Moelis is 
a financial and professional services company, as well as an investment bank offering assistance 
with mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and the raising of capital for equity.98  
Rdio had originally hired Moelis to help find investors that might allow it to continue 
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operations.99  After this proved to be, in the Debtor’s own words, “unfeasible,” Rdio asked 
Moelis for additional assistance to find a buyer or potential partner.100  It found Pandora.101   
 
 Pandora would eventually make an all cash offer of $75 million for substantially all of 
Rdio’s technology and engineers, on the condition that the transaction be made pursuant to a 
Chapter 11 § 363 sale with Pandora as the Stalking Horse Bidder and on the condition of an 
expedient bidding procedure and adequate overbid protections.102  To this end the Debtor applied 
to the Court to appoint Moelis as the Debtor’s Financial Advisor.103  It argued that Moelis’ role 
as the Debtors’ representative during the unsuccessful attempts to raise equity capital made 
Moelis uniquely qualified to serve as its financial advisor for the required overbid procedures 
(the specific procedures required in this case are discussed in detail on pages 27-29), and their 
prior history made Moelis the most cost effective firm under the circumstances.104  It supported 
this argument with three supporting declarations filed on November 16, 2015 along with the 
other first day motions.105 106 107  
  
 The U.S. Trustee’s office objected to this motion on December 3, 2015.108  They based 
their objections on several issues including the nature of the proposed indemnity agreements 
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with Moelis and Rdio, insufficient disclosure about their pre-petition relationship, and by 
claiming that Moelis’ fees would likely provide no benefit to the Debtor and be unreasonable 
insofar that the Debtor was, “already at great risk of administrative insolvency.”109  The first and 
most prominent claim was that there was a conflict of interest because Moelis had been 
previously employed to help find a buyer or merger partner for Rdio in the negotiations leading 
up the deal with Pandora.  The Trustee claimed that because Moelis was employed by Pulser for 
this service they would have an “irreconcilable conflict of intertest,” as part of this prior 
relationship.110   
 
 Rdio responded to this objection six days later, on December 9, 2015.111  Its primary 
response was to highlight what it described as Moelis’ limited role in, “marketing the Debtor’s 
assets/business for overbid, rather than acting as the Debtor’s restructuring advisor.”112  Rdio 
claimed this distinction was especially relevant because Moelis had previously only been 
engaged to find the highest possible value for Rdio in a merger or sale and that the function it 
was applying for in the Chapter 11 case was substantially the same.  It was engaged to solicit 
overbids for the asset sale, as was required by the approved bidding procedures.113  Rdio claimed 
this function was, “to grow the pot of assets available for distribution” (as opposed to 
determining distribution).114  It further argued that this function meant there was no material 
conflict of interest because insofar as Moelis would be able to maximize the sale amount for 
Rdio’s assets, Pulser and the Debtor would have aligned interests.115  Moelis also agreed to 
change some of the language in its engagement letter with the Debtor to help alleviate some of 
the Trustee’s concerns.116  
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 The court held a hearing on the application to employ Moelis on December 10, 2015 and 
mostly addressed the indemnity language in the Debtor’s engagement with Moelis then ruled that 
the Court would only allow Moelis to be employed if it changed the language in its engagement 
letter to include negligence in the list of things inapplicable to Moelis’ indemnification 
agreement, which had only previously included “bad faith” and “gross negligence.”  The Court 
felt that without this included language, Moelis had effectively forced the Debtor to indemnify it 
in the event of Moelis’ negligence, a provision the Court could not accept.117  In the end Moelis 
agreed to change the indemnification language in the engagement letter and the Court approved 
its employment.118  
 
 It is important to remember that Pandora was the only bidder to purchase the Debtor’s 
assets and their original offer of $75 million was accepted.119  Also, Moelis made a motion for 
compensation from the Debtor’s estate in the amount of $2,177,798.39.  This included $2.15 
million in fees plus $27,798.39 in allowed expenses.  This order was entered April 13, 2016, 
approximately 4 months after Moelis was authorized for employment by the court on December 
10, 2015.120 
 
V. The Sale to Pandora 
 
The first step to pushing this deal through was to establish procedures for bidding at the 
363 sale.121  Rdio filed a motion to this end on November 16, 2015.122  After a relatively 
exhaustive table of authorities, the motion began by asking for approval of the sale process and 
bidding procedures attached as exhibits, and for overbidders to use either: 
 
1) substantially the same asset purchase agreement as negotiated with Pandora, or  
                                                          
117 Order Authorizing the Employment and Retention of Moelis & Company LLC, as Financial 
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2) a redlined version of the APA negotiated with Pandora.   
 
The Debtor also requested that Pandora be approved as the Stalking Horse Bidder and be 
given special bid protections, final approval on the forms for notice and procedures for 
objections, and a scheduling of an expedited hearing to finalize the sale and get the desired res 
judicata effect on the transfer of assets.123  Some of the most onerous bid protections sought 
included: 
 
 A minimum initial overbid requirement of $1 million.124 
 
 Minimum bid increments of $500,000.125 
 
 A requirement that prospective bidders post a bond of 10% or $7.6 million, which is 
10% of the Pandora bid added with the $1 million overbid fee.126 
 
 A requirement that a potential bidder submit proof of their ability to pay the 
purchase price at least 5 days before the bidding deadline.127 
 
 A requirement that any bid must have a closing date no later than the proposed 
closing date in the proposed APA.128 
 
The Debtor again listed the circumstances that brought Rdio into bankruptcy and assured 
the court that Rdio was burning fast, and reasserted the urgency with which a sale needed to be 
conducted, and even explained how Pulser and Iconical agreed to provide DIP financing to 
facilitate liquidity throughout the sale process.  This DIP financing came in the form of a $3 
                                                          
123 Id. 
124 Id at 56. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Debtor's Emergency Motion for an Order: (1) Approving Bidding Procedures; (2) Approving 
Stalking Horse Bid Protections Including Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement. . .;, Doc. 
No. 13 at 57. 
128 Id.   
21 
 
million super-priority credit facility.  There was also a tentative carve out of $500K for the 
administrative class.129  
 
 The motion to approve the bidding procedures also addressed the secured elephant in the 
room.130  With $190 million in secured debt, the expected sale price of $75 million would leave 
the unsecured creditors with nothing.  The motion maade no promises for the likes of the 
Committee, but rather kicked the can down the road on that issue by saying only that it was open 
to negotiating a carve out of the sales proceeds for the unsecured class.131  The recurring theme 
in the first day motions was the extremely urgent need for a prompt, swift, and final disposal of 
assets to Pandora, in order to capture what little value was left in Rdio before it was too late.  All 
the first day motions were filed on November 11, 2015 and Pandora purportedly required that 
approval of the bidding procedures needed to be completed by December 1, 2015 or it would 
walk away.132  The Debtor recited multiple times, almost talismanically, the magic words of 
“irreparable harm.”  Their oft repeated position was that time was of the essence, the sale needed 
to proceed, and it was prudent to postpone the inevitable fight with the unsecured creditors for 
later in the process.133  Pandora’s unsubtle ultimatum finally gave Rdio the exact ammunition it 
needed to pressure the Court into approving the sale as quickly as possible.  
 
 The remainder of the motion to approve the sale consisted mostly of form facts that also 
appeared in almost every filing in the case: Rdio had unsustainable operating losses, the 
proposed asset sale solicited needed to be conducted by Moelis, and the sale was urgent.  Rdio 
also cites the commitment of secured creditors Pulser and Iconical to providing DIP financing 
moving forward.134  There was little mention of the secured creditors at this early stage.  A 
substantial amount of the language in all the first day motions was identical to the declarations in 
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support of the bidding protections from Rdio General Counsel and VP Elliot Peters, Moelis agent 
Carlos Jimenez, and Pandora Chief Corporate Counsel Jeremy Leigl.135 136 137 
 
The declarations supporting the sale to Pandora began with Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel of Rdio, Elliot Peters, supporting the bidding procedures that would ultimately 
culminate in Pandora’s successful stalking horse bid.138 139  The description of the Debtor, its 
business, and its assets added nothing new as far as facts.  In his declaration, Peters listed the 
assets of the business, and the then-current debts of approximately $190 million in secured debt 
with Pulser Media owning approximately $186 million of that secured debt.140  The declaration 
also notes that Pulser was the majority owner of Rdio, owning approximately 79% of Rdio’s 
equity.141  The other $4 million in secured debt was owned by the only other secured debtor: 
Iconical II.  Both Iconical II and Pulser held a blanket interest in more or less all of Rdio’s 
assets.142 
 
 In keeping with Rdio’s narrative of events, Mr. Peters’ declaration detailed the long and 
involved history of Moelis, its past business with the Debtor, and how it was able to solicit a 
letter of intent from Pandora to acquire Rdio’s key assets for $75 million.143  In this same 
transaction, Pandora agreed to assume certain key contracts including employment contracts for 
important personnel who were essential to effectively utilizing, maintaining, and further 
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developing the software.144  Various stakeholders in these contracts, including some third parties, 
would of course be allowed time to object, and Pandora would work to cure any problems caused 
by its assumptions.145  15% of the purchase price would be put in escrow as well for Rdio to 
indemnify Pandora in the event of any breaches.146  In a true instance of everyone realizing the 
meaning of “mutual best interests,” Iconical agreed to guarantee Rdio’s indemnification of 
Pandora as well in order to make the deal go through.147  The declaration was eager to point out 
that Pandora’s acquisition of key assets was premised upon key employees coming over to 
Pandora.148  This was extremely important in the larger context of the bankruptcy, because there 
were many instances in which Rdio asked the court to allow it to pay, not only regular salaries 
and benefits to employees, but also to pay out what amounted to “retention bonuses.”149  While 
that may seem extravagant at first, their argument for such retention bonuses was substantially 
more meritorious than at first glance.   
 
 Rdio had been exceeding its burn rate for a long time.150  Many of the employees of Rdio 
were very likely already shopping around for future employment, knowing that it was only a 
matter of time until Rdio went under.  Once it became clear that Rdio was filing for bankruptcy, 
and that Pandora was not acquiring the company outright, it was essential to the deal for certain 
employees be retained in order to preserve value in the sale.151  Without key engineers, and a 
team to run the software, the value of Rdio would plummet, and all Rdio’s creditors would take a 
much larger hit.  What many outsiders might be tempted to label as Wall Street style greed, was 
actually in the best interests of all parties involved.  Pandora would not go through on the sale 
without the employees, and without Pandora, Rdio was just a pile of code and overpriced 
licensing agreements that would be worth only a small fraction of the already low purchase 
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price.152  The entire deal with Pandora was subject to brief deadlines that, in essence, made Rdio 
the hostage of Pandora.  The implication was that if the court did not comply with the demands, 
Pandora would pull the trigger and the value for all creditors to fight over would fall nearly to 
zero.  Following with that dynamic, Pandora built in several preferential provisions into the 
deal.153   
 
 Pandora built in a “Break-Up Fee” of $2.25 million that would go to Pandora if it 
remained the highest bidder at auction.154  Pandora would also be reimbursed up to $500K for 
expenses it undertook during and related to the auction.  Peters’ declaration told the court that 
these provisions and fees, designed to virtually ensure that Pandora, as the stalking horse, would 
win the auction, were all “intensely negotiated,” and “an integral part of the [s]ale.”155  The 
protections, “were absolutely required in order that the Purchaser [would] proceed with [the] sale 
transaction.”156  
 
 Pulser and Iconical also agreed to keep Rdio afloat until the sale was finalized.157  This 
seemed designed to signal to the Court that the secured creditors, the Debtor, and the stalking 
horse were all on the same page, implicitly asking the Court to consider their agreement if other 
parties were to try to dispute the validity of the sale.  To further solidify this dynamic, Peters’ 
declarations also carefully used the following language to show the Court that, even if the 
interests of the unsecured creditors were adverse to other interests, the secured creditors were 
team players: 
 
 Also, the secured creditors have not excluded the possibility of negotiating with 
the Debtor and the creditors’ committee (if appointed) a further “carve out” from the sale 
proceeds to fund administrative expenses and provide a meaningful distribution to 
unsecured creditors.158 
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This quote masterfully signals to the Court that the Debtor, stalking horse, and secured creditors 
are, according to their own narrative, the rational parties here. At the same time, this language 
promises anything of substance.   
 
 After insinuating to the Court that they were the morally superior faction, the declaration 
outlines why they were ostensibly the logically superior faction as well.  The only bold text in 
the entire declaration, aside from headings, stated that, “the timing of the sale process is 
critical,”159  While true, the urgency with which Peters hammers this home is arguably 
hyperbolic.  The declarations repeatedly urge the Court to approve the bidding and sale 
procedure, noting that “particularly with regard to potential loss of its employee talent, the 
continuing desirability and value of the Debtor’s business is clearly jeopardized by delay,”160 
“The Purchaser has understandably required a prompt sale process,”161 and “Purchaser advised 
the Debtor that it would only proceed with a transaction if that transaction were conducted as 
part of a Chapter 11 filing and a purchase pursuant to a sale under the Bankruptcy Code.”162  The 
repeated implication was that Rdio had to submit to the demands of Pandora if they wanted to 
retain any value in their failed venture.  While this was true, every time they engaged in this line 
of rhetoric, they failed to point out that the unsecured creditors would likely be left with virtually 
nothing.  The proceeds from the sale could not cover the secured debt, and it would only be after 
four failed plans and external litigation that Pulser was forced to agree to reclassify a substantial 
portion of its secured debt as the lowest class of unsecured debt, which essentially made that 
portion worthless.   
 
 Peters support for the bid protections concluded by stating that Pandora “[was] uniquely 
situated in regard to the Debtor’s assets, that the prospects for any overbid to Purchaser’s offer 
[were] extremely remote, and that purchase price offered by Purchaser is very likely to be 
substantially higher than the purchase price that any other buyer would be willing to pay, based 
on the complimentary nature of the respective businesses.”163  The Court approved the bidding 
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protections and procedures and ultimately, the sale to Pandora.164 165  There was no overbid.166  
The remainder of the fighting, which lasted for nearly a year, would be over how the proceeds 
were to be distributed.167  That distribution, more precisely, would be what amount the unsecured 
creditors could dig out of Pulser with the looming threat of seeking equitable subordination 
 
VI. The Debtor has Difficulty Approving a Plan.   
 
A. The First Plan.  
 
 The first plan began with the standard summaries of law, disclaimers of reliance on the 
information for any purpose other than confirmation, and other form language regarding how, 
when and where to vote.168  As with virtually all Chapter 11 plans, administrative claims and 
priority tax claims came first.169  Class 1 under this plan would have been Iconical’s secured 
claims, and would have been paid in full.170  Class 2 would have been Pulser and its secured 
claims, and proposed to pay Pulser all estate funds and any future recoveries by the Debtor, with 
the only caveats being that: 
 
1) this would not happen until the higher priority classes were paid in full; 
2)  class 3 would have to be paid in full;  
3) the tax escrow would have to be fully funded; and  
4) the settlement fund would have to be fully filled.171   
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 The Debtor would have also released all causes of action against the secured creditors in 
consideration of being allowed to use cash collateral.172  This ensured that the unsecured 
creditors could not, through the debtor, get at the secured creditors.173  Also, in this plan, Class 3 
was not the unsecured creditors, but rather non-tax priority claims such as employee salaries and 
benefits.174  Class 4 would have been allowed pro rata shares of the settlement fund and would 
have been compromised essentially of all unsecured creditors except those of Sony, Warner, and 
Universal who would have gotten their own class, class 5.175   
 
 Class 5 was more detailed than the other classes.  The first plan listed the claims each of 
the major unsecured creditors in this class, then listed the smaller amounts that the Debtor 
claimed to owe. The first plan then proceeded to state the amount which would have been paid to 
members of Class 5. That amount would have been not what the Debtor believed was the amount 
of their claim but rather something else entirely.176  This bold gambit is described here:  
 
As outlined in more detail below, the Debtor believes that it has substantial and 
valuable claims against the Labels as a result of wrongful conduct by the Labels, 
which, if pursued, will result in a substantial affirmative recovery by the Debtor. 
The Debtor believes that the pursuit of these claims against the Labels will result 
in the complete disallowance of the class 5 claims of the Labels or, at a minimum, 
the complete equitable subordination of the class 5 claims of the Labels to all 
other allowed claims. In order to avoid the delay and expense of litigating the 
class 5 claims of the Labels, the Debtor is offering each of the Labels a settlement 
under the Plan. The settlement offer is for each of the Labels to receive a payment 
from the Debtor equal to 5% of the amount of the midpoint between the scheduled 
claims and filed claims of the Labels.177   
 
 To put this in perspective, the Debtor claimed that it owed Sony alone $2.7 million, while 
Sony claimed that it was owed $12.4MM. That is a very large haircut for all the secured 
creditors. The payment amounts under this plan were laid out as follows:  
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 A payment of $506,074.84 to Sony as 5% of the amount of the midpoint of 
$10,121,496.72; 178 
 
 a payment of $29,755.15 to Warner as 5% of the midpoint of $595,102.92; 179 and  
 
 a payment of $52,779.16 to Universal as 5% of the midpoint of $1,055,583.27).180  
 
 This settlement would have included a release of all claims of most parties against all 
other parties, ending the standoff.  Unfortunately for Rdio and its management, this first draft of 
the plan was not accepted.181  There would ultimately be 5 proposed plans in total, the 5th and 
final plan being the result of negotiations aided by a court appointed mediator.182  
 
B. The Second Plan 
 
In the second proposed plan, the administrative claims, priority tax claims, class 1, class 
2, and class 3 would have been treated essentially the same as they would have been under the 
first plan.183  Class 4 was estimated in this plan to get between $0.20 and $0.25 on the dollar.184  
Class 2, Pulser, would get whatever was left after paying fixed settlements to class 5, as well as 
paying the various funds and escrows needing to be filled to satisfy the other classes.185  While 
the methodology of how Pulser was to be paid would have been the same under this plan, the 
final amount would have been different. The feasibility of this plan depended on class 4 and 
class 5, which both got a bump up in payment from the first plan, but it was ultimately not 
enough to end this dispute. 
 
 In this plan the following amounts of settlement were offered and rejected by class 5:  
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 $775,000 total cash to Sony186; 
 
 $100,000.00 cash to Warner187; and  
 
 $125,000.00 cash to Universal188. 
 
 This would have been accompanied by the standard release of all claims by, between, and 
among all parties.189  Rdio also included an acknowledgment in the plan that Sony, Universal, 
and Warner believed the Debtor’s supposed causes of action against them were worthless.190  
This ultimately resulted in approximately a 40% increase to the settlement payments offered to 
the music labels by the Debtor, but still far, far below what the unsecured creditors claimed they 
were owed.  These proposals were all against the backdrop of, what the unsecured creditors had 
speculated, was Pulser’s sham equity masquerading as secured debt.191   
 
C. The Third Plan 
 
 The third plan, once again, made substantive changes to classes 4 and 5.192 Class 4 under 
this plan would have received an estimated amount of approximately $0.054 on the dollar, or in 
other words, 5.4% of their claims, which was still quite a big hit downward from the last plan.193  
Clearly class 5 had enough bargaining power, such that the secured creditors, the Debtor, and 
class 4 altogether could not persuade class 5 into accepting the deal as it had been offered so far.  
In this proposed plan, Pulser would have taken a haircut in the amount of approximately $35.7 
million by reducing its unsecured claim (which already was reduced from its earlier, much larger 
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secured claim) down to $100 million, of which it would have still received only pennies on the 
dollar.194 
 
 There was some progress by the 3rd plan, however, in the form of a settlement with 
Universal, which agreed to settle and release all claims, so they could walk away for $125K paid 
from the Unsecured Creditors Fund.195  The terms of the settlement would be written up in a 
separate agreement, but this was significant progress from earlier attempts.196  Each time a major 
studio stopped fighting, the remaining big labels and other unsecured creditors were backed a 
little more in the corner, all the while the administrative class was billing hours and increasing its 
claim.   
 
 Class 6 would have consisted of Warner, and they also reached a settlement in the 
amount of $100K.197  Class 7 would have been equity, and would have received nothing.  Sony’s 
claim was still being vigorously disputed and negotiations apparently broke down.  This plan 
contemplated using various supposedly meritorious claims owned by the Debtor against Sony to 
aid in financing the rest of the plan, and to repay the amount of Pulser’s secured claim that had 
been split into class 4.198  Reading this plan alone, it would seem as though Pulser, through Rdio, 
was preparing to go to war with Sony.  The claims, insofar as this plan is concern, were still 
being determined, but they were tentatively outlined as anti-trust in nature.199 200  This was not 
altogether unpredictable, as Sony was the largest unsecured creditor, and they had filed a lawsuit 
in New York against Rdio’s management, which Rdio had unsuccessfully tried to halt with a 
temporary restraining order.201  The dispute between the debtor and Sony in the media and in the 
courts is discussed more fully in section E below.   
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D. The Fourth Plan 
 
 In the fourth and penultimate plan, Sony came back to the negotiating table.  Rdio’s 
threats of antitrust litigation seemed to have died down, and Pulser agreed to “purchase” all of 
Sony’s claims against Rdio, which had grown to approximately $17 million by Sony’s 
estimates.202 This draft still gave Universal a $125K settlement203, and Warner a $100K 
settlement.204  Through this arrangement, there would have been approximately $5 million left in 
the Unsecured Creditors Fund to pay out class 4, which was estimated to have been between $20 
and $30 million in claims.205  The Debtor estimated that class 4 would have received 
approximately 17%-20% of their claims, or $0.17 - $0.20 on the dollar.206  It was also during the 
negotiation of this plan that all parties agreed to stipulate on the appointment of a mediator, 
which the court accepted on August 2, 2016. This was approximately four months after Rdio 
tried to get its first plan approved.207   
 
E. Analysis of the Dispute with Sony. 
 
 Throughout the negotiations on the various plans, Sony was not pleased with how Rdio’s 
Chapter 11 was turning out.  Sony was by far the largest unsecured creditor of Rdio with claims, 
it estimated, between $12 and $17 million, and it was in danger of taking home little, if 
anything.208  Sony filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York against Rdio General Counsel Elliot Peters, Rdio CEO Anthony Bay, and Jim 
Rondinelli, the Senior Vice President of Rdio, for fraud.209  The complaint stated in relevant part, 
among other things:  
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Defendant Bay was—and upon information and belief still is—also 
an owner, executive officer, and director of Pulser Media, Inc., 
which owned 79% of Rdio and held 98% of the secured debt 
issued by Rdio. Thus, in the event of an Rdio bankruptcy, Pulser 
and Bay expected to be first in line to recover whatever value 
remained in Rdio.210 
 
It further alleged: 
 
Unbeknownst to [Sony Music Entertainment], however, at the 
same time that Rdio was negotiating the amendment to its Content 
Agreement with SME, it was simultaneously negotiating its deal 
with Pandora—under which Rdio would file for bankruptcy; 
Pandora would buy Rdio’s assets out of bankruptcy; defendant Bay 
(as part-owner, executive officer, and director of Rdio’s secured 
creditor) would expect to be first in line to receive proceeds of the 
Pandora deal; and SME (as an unsecured creditor) would receive 
pennies on the dollar for the amounts owed to it under the 
amended Content Agreement. 
 
 Defendants knew that, had SME learned about Rdio’s 
negotiations with Pandora at any time during the negotiations to 
amend the Content Agreement, SME would have demanded 
immediate payment of the $5.5 million that Rdio owed to SME, 
and would have refused to grant Rdio further access to the 
recordings owned by SME. That in turn would have substantially 
diminished Rdio’s business and jeopardized the secret proposed 
sale to Pandora. In order to induce SME to continue to provide 
Rdio with the rights to SME’s catalog, Defendants continued to 
negotiate the terms of an amendment to the Content Agreement—
exchanging term sheets that contemplated payments by Rdio over 
a period of years—while concealing from SME the fact that Rdio 
was negotiating an agreement with Pandora that Defendants knew 
would render Rdio unable to meet these obligations to SME.211 
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 These were obviously very serious claims coming from Sony, and if successfully litigated 
could have been disastrous for Rdio’s executives, which were the named defendants.212  If the 
defendants named under this complaint were in fact culpable of knowingly committing a fraud 
against Sony, and if that type of bad faith behavior were not covered by insurance, then Sony 
would have had to know it wasn’t going to recover much of its judgment, other than possibly 
foreclosure proceeds on the defendants personal assets.  Sony, it could be easily argued, was 
litigating on principle or for some other reason, like leverage.   
 
 If the facts alleged in the complaint were true, then there was some egregious behavior 
from Rdio’s leadership.  The complaint alleged that the day before executing a renewal 
amendment with Sony, Rdio had already signed a letter of intent with Pandora signaling its intent 
to file a Chapter 11 petition and, consequently, never pay Sony at all.213  It is understandable why 
Sony would be so outraged if any of these allegations were indeed correct.  Interestingly, 
however, even though Sony claimed Rdio’s largest unsecured creditor to the tune of 
approximately $12 million214, it’s not as if they had actually loaned Rdio cash for a mere promise 
to pay.  Their status as a creditor was, in essence, for unpaid bills in regards to licensing 
agreements from Sony.215  Sony was out of lost profits, and there is something to be said for an 
argument that Sony was akin to a lost-volume seller, but other than labor in negotiating these 
contracts, Sony was not truly losing cash, which may contributed to the ultimate decision to 
settle. 
 
 The Sony complaint went on to allege that Rdio officers intentionally misrepresented 
their plans and ability to raise operating capital to pay Sony so that Sony would stay at the table 
and negotiate, all the while Rdio was trying to close its deal with Pandora, which may have 
walked away if it heard that Sony had stopped licensing to Rdio.216  The facts, as they are 
presented in the complaint, seem to make sense with the history of events that led up to Rdio’s 
Chapter 11 petition.  
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 Meanwhile, back in California in the Bankruptcy Court, Sony was filing a motion to 
appoint an examiner.217  They truly began to attack Rdio on all fronts. That motion, in relevant 
part, stated: 
 
It is clear that from the commencement of this chapter 11 case the 
Debtor has sought to improperly leverage the provisions of chapter 
11 for the sole benefit of Pulser and Iconical II, their affiliates, and 
their shared officers and directors. The Debtor has proposed 
settling the Debtor’s recharacterization and equitable subordination 
claims against Pulser and Iconical II – the estate’s largest and most 
valuable asset – for pennies on the dollar. It is unclear who 
“negotiated” the agreement on behalf of the Debtor with Pulser and 
Iconical II, but given Iconical II’s and Pulser’s complete dominion 
and control over the Debtor and shared executives, it is clear that 
the negotiation could not have been at arms’ length.218 
 
 Alternatively, Sony asked that the case be converted to a Chapter 7.219  That request 
began by citing numerous authorities that purported to show when it was appropriate to convert 
to Chapter 7. Further, it stated that the enumerated causes for conversion in the Bankruptcy Code 
are not exhaustive, and that the Court has wide discretion in determining when it is appropriate 
to make such a conversion.220  Sony also pointed out that, as all parties to this proceeding know, 
Rdio was cashflow negative and has no chance of being “reorganized” in the true spirit of 
Chapter 11.221  Sony’s problem was that, in essence, this was a controlled liquidation with Sony 
at the bottom, or near bottom, of the priority ladder; and Sony was threatening to burn the whole 
thing down.222  Sony pointed to the enormous and ever growing costs of the administrative class, 
including the time wasted in trying to confirm plans that Rdio knew Sony would not allow to go 
through, as well as the continued loss of money to maintaining payroll, including paying the very 
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same officers that allegedly perpetrated a fraud against Sony.223  Sony then finished this volley 
by filing a request for discovery that Rdio hand over everything it had forming a basis for Rdio’s 
allegations that Sony was engaged in various anti-trust violations, including price-fixing.224 
 
 As for Rdio, they never filed a complaint against Sony. The most in-depth elaboration 
they give in any document filed is in their supporting documents when they filed the 3rd plan. 
There is a brief “claims against Sony” section that states in relevant part as follows: 
 
 …the Debtor believes that Sony and Orchard have engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct to fix and control prices and unreasonably restrain trade for the licensing, 
marketing, and use of music by services, like the Debtor, for the digital streaming of 
music to consumers worldwide.225 
 
 Rdio essentially accused Sony of collusive price-fixing to maintain excessively high 
prices for licensing its content to music streaming services like Rdio.226  Not much else is said to 
support these allegations, other than Rdio expressly reserved the right to pursue all causes of 
action against Sony, and by the time of the 4th plan, Sony had come back into the fold and was 
willing to settle.227   However, to an impartial observer, these raw allegations from Rdio, without 
more, could be evaluated as mere posturing.  It was possible that both Sony and Rdio were 
merely posturing against one another, and jockeying for more leverage at the negotiation table, 
but if that was indeed the case, it looks as if Sony was more adept at the practice.  Negotiation 
strategies aside, the Debtor was finally able to confirm a plan in mid-August, 2016. 
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F. The Final Plan is Confirmed. 
 
 While Rdio voluntarily filed their Chapter 11 petition on November 16, 2015,228 they did 
not get a final plan approved until August 18, 2016, when Rdio created its “Debtor’s Plan of 
Reorganization Dated August 18, 2016.” (hereinafter the “Plan”).229  The Plan was purportedly 
supported by the Unsecured Creditors Committee, the secured creditors (Pulser and Iconical), 
and the “big three” studios.230 The Plan, once enacted, would be immune to appeal or 
rehearing.231  
 
 The Plan kept certain claims unclassified because they would not be impaired, and 
therefore would not be entitled to vote on the plan232: these were administrative expenses and 
certain priority tax claims, essentially setting aside funds so that the lawyers, accountants, and 
other professionals who administered the bankruptcy, and the government, would be paid in 
full.233  This approach is very common, and it has the additional effect of keeping these parties 
disinterested and removed from the possibility of muddying the negotiations for the major parties 
moving forward.234   
 
 The Plan takes the typical approach of classifying the remaining claims into secured and 
unsecured, with appropriate sub categories.235 The secured claims would be divided first into 
“Class 1,” which consisted solely of secured creditor Iconical’s claim, and “Class 2” which 
similarly consisted solely of secured creditor Pulser’s claim.236  Class 1 would be paid 
approximately $4,500,000, ostensibly satisfying it in full and consequently removing it from 
voting on the Plan.237  Class 2, Pulser’s secured claim of more than $180 million, would be split 
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to approximately $47,000,000 left in class 2, and shunting the remaining $136,000,000 to fall 
into Class 4, which would be a category of unsecured claims.238  The Plan further stated that 
Pulser would not receive any of this remaining $136,000,000 unsecured claim.  This may seem 
like a steep hit, but remember that Pulser was the majority stakeholder of Rdio, and likely made 
those secured loans as an alternative to investing more equity, which they knew they would lose 
entirely in bankruptcy.   
 
 Frankly, an argument could be made that Pulser makes out very handsomely, even after it 
voluntarily subordinated such a large portion of its claim, because it would not be inconceivable 
that it could have been equitably subordinated by Court order, putting its entire secured claim 
either with the unsecured, or with equity, leaving them with little or nothing.  Pulser was the first 
player to be impaired under the Plan, so they would get a vote in whether or not to approve the 
plan moving forward.239  The Plan did offer Pulser one additional “freebie” of sorts: it stated that, 
“On account of its class 2 secured claim, Pulser [would] receive all of the Estate Funds 
remaining on the Effective Date after all required Plan payments have been made….”240  It is 
highly unlikely that there would be anything left over after the execution of the Plan, but if there 
was, Pulser would get to cash the check.  Lastly, Rdio and Rdio’s bankruptcy estate agreed to 
release Pulser and Iconical from any claims or liabilities. This additional consideration could 
have been worth a relatively meager sum, or quite a sizeable one.241  
 
 Moving forward, the Plan detailed treatment for the unsecured claims, first setting up 
treatment for priority unsecured claims, “Class 3,” entitled to such under the bankruptcy code.242  
Here those priority unsecured claims would be approximately $270,000 for former employees.243  
The next class of unsecured claims in the Plan is “Class 4.”244 This excludes the unsecured 
claims of Universal, Warner, and Sony, which settled their disputes against the Debtor.245  The 
                                                          
238 Id at 11: 11-26.  
239 Id at 12: 1-8. 
240 Id at 16: 11-16. 
241 Debtor’s Plan of Reorganization dated August 18, 2016, Doc. No. 398, at 18: 3-18. 
242 Id at 10: 9-21. 
243 Id. 
244 Id at 11-12.. 
245 Id at 10-14. 
38 
 
total amount of unsecured claims in Class 4 was estimated in the Plan to be anywhere from 
approximately $25,000,000 to approximately $49,000,000.246  
 
 Sony settled by reaching an agreement with Pulser where Pulser would purchase all of 
Sony’s claims which they valued at approximately $17,000,000247 , after their day-long 
mediation session in front of retired bankruptcy judge Allan Gropper on August 4, 2016.248  
Universal and their subsidiaries or affiliates total claims amounted to approximately $1,300,000, 
of which they settled for $125,000.249  Warner claimed approximately $619,000, and settled for 
$100,000.250  The last class, “Class 5,” consisted of equity and would receive nothing, and would 
not be entitled to vote on the Plan.251 
 
 The preferential treatment of administrative and tax claims in this case is more or less 
industry standard, but it is not insignificant.252  Rdio’s bankruptcy counsel, Levene, Neale, 
Bender, Yoo & Brill, LLP, comes out with $1,000,000 in estimated pre-petition fees, and not 
counting additional post-petition fees as well.  Another law firm retained by the debtor to, 
Winston & Strawn LLP, which was listed as “special litigation counsel,” that was applied for by 
the debtor, and approved by the Court to assist the estate in evaluating and pursuing its claims 
against the major record labels.253  Its fees come out with $100,000 post-petition retainer.254  The 
Unsecured Creditors’ Committee’s counsel, Pachulski Stang Zeihl & Jones LLP, would collect 
an estimated $500,000 in pre-petition fees in addition to post-petition fees not listed in the 
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Plan.255  The Committee’s financial advisor, FTI Consulting, would estimate $150,000 to be set 
aside for pre-petition fees, and of course that did not include post-petition fees either.256  As for 
tax, the Plan sets aside approximately $130,000 pending adjustments as needed.257  In total, the 
lawyers and other consultants were paid more than $4.4 million, including: 
 
 Debtor’s Counsel - $1,017,332.66258 
 Debtor’s special Counsel - $360,012.63259 
 Debtor’s Financial Advisor - $2,177,798.39260 
 Unsecured Creditor’s Counsel - $431,375.00261 
 Unsecured Creditor’s financial consultant - $415,013.50262 
 
VI. The Future of Pandora, and the Streaming Music Business. 
 
 The music streaming industry exists in a harsh and unforgiving business landscape, that 
has only recently begun to show promise.263  As Rdio found out, the operating costs of acquiring 
and maintaining both licenses and listeners is enormous, and no streaming service to date has 
made profit from selling advertising alone.264  They need subscription fees in order to survive, 
and most people today are not willing to pay for music that they can readily get for free, with the 
notable exception of Apple Music listeners. Apple Music does not offer a free ad-supported 
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model, only premium with subscription fees.  Apple music, however, is still not ironclad on its 
future profitability.  If any service out there right now will remain standing after the collapse of 
glut of music streaming services currently available, however, it will likely be Apple Music.265  
This is because Apple Music doesn’t need to be strictly profitable on its own to be of value as a 
customer acquisition platform for the greater Apple family of products and services.266   
 
 Pandora and Spotify, on the other hand, don’t have anywhere to send a customer once 
acquired. Their streaming services are the terminal destination.  Apple, however, will gladly take 
some losses on Apple Music if it gets more people using its other products and services, and it 
believes this will happen.  Further, Apple seems to have learned a few lessons from its 
competitors in this space, by offering only the subscription model, they are trying a different 
method in the game.  Apple music is still relatively small compared to Spotify and Pandora, 
hosting approximately 13 million user in 2016.267  Apple doesn’t need to make money with 
Apple Music, now, or in the future, in order to keep the service around.  They also appear to be 
taking the slow and steady approach, instead of looking for explosive growth in revenues with 
the potential for a buyout if needed (which seems to be the more common approach among 
others in the music streaming space).  Apple Music’s future is still tenuous, but if any streaming 
service will survive, and most of them will not, it looks at this time that it will be Apple Music. 
 
 By comparison Spotify, the largest streaming service out right now, is not doing well 
either, and by most metrics, they are arguably the most successful music streaming service on the 
planet with approximately 90 million users.268  Regardless of their massive user base, they 
continue to report losses.269  Spotify reported losses of $184MM in 2014 and $206MM in 
2015.270  This is due to the same problems Rdio had.  The costs of overheard in running a music 
streaming service are enormous.271  License agreements and payroll are colossal.272  Further, 
once you’ve put out a free ad-supported model, there is really no going back to only offering 
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premium.  Ad-supported free accounts, as Rdio learned, and Spotify and Pandora know all too 
well, are valuable only insofar as they may turn into paying subscribers.273  The ads alone will 
likely never outpace the cost of providing the music, unless the studios creating the content 
change their pricing significantly.  Lastly, while things look grim at the moment for Spotify, the 
service continues to lead the market in terms of overall revenue growth (even if losses continue) 
and growth of users.274  Spotify is hurting, but it doesn’t look poised to be the next music 
streaming service to go under.  That position is currently held by the company that bought out 
the remains of Rdio: Pandora.   
 
 Things have not gone well for Pandora since it acquired Rdio.275  Its stock price shot 
down precipitously upon the acquisition, and has not measurably gone up since that time.276  The 
company as a whole was valued at approximately $7 billion in 2014 and has shot down to a 
rough evaluation of approximately $2 billion since.277  There were rumors circulating for a time 
that Pandora was looking for buyers, and this caused a slight rally in their share prices, but that 
too was lost when the company switched CEOs and stopped looking for buyers.278  Pandora is 
currently operating with losses of nearly $10 million per month, twice the operating losses Rdio 
had when it went into bankruptcy.279 280  Further, they estimated that they would lose nearly $200 
million in 2016 alone.281  There were talks that maybe Amazon, Google, or Apple would acquire 
Pandora, mainly for their roughly 80 million userbase, but the price tag of $2 billion was just too 
much.282   
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 There is a relative consensus among investors that Pandora is poised to go the same way 
Rdio did, and for more or less the exact same reasons.283  Pandora, however, unlike Rdio, is no 
longer a fresh startup.  The company has been around since 2000, and for a while looked to be 
the undisputed champion of the music streaming space.284  Unfortunately for them, however, 
their “internet radio” approach where listeners choose only genres, as opposed to choosing 
specific albums and songs, has not held up as services like Spotify and Apple Music have come 
into the same market.  Pandora hoped to use the assets it acquired from Rdio to revamp its 
services and being to offer individual song selection along with its traditional internet radio 
approach, but hope that this change in their model would allow them to outpace Spotify and 
Apple Music have faced a cruel reality that while Apple Music and Spotify are growing their 
user bases, Pandora is at best stagnant or at worst losing users, though reports vary.285 286 287  
Regardless, one thing is clear, Pandora is currently in serious trouble, and while talks of 
bankruptcy are not yet publicly on the table, talks of being bought out by a competitor certainly 
are, and that was the exact same beginning which lead to Rdio being acquired by Pandora.288  It 
looks, at least at this time, that Pandora will go the same direction that Rdio did, if they decide to 
look for, and can find a buyer.  Apple Music and Spotify may be content to simply watch 
Pandora fold completely and allow a natural acquisition of their users for free in the marketplace.  
Time will tell. 
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